I. Introduction
The European Court of Justice (hereinafter ECJ) rarely deals with electoral rights 1 but has never addressed the matter of rights to vote and stand as a candidate in elections for appointment to the European Parliament. Recently, however, the ECJ's Grand Chamber has had to deal with questions concerning the identity of persons who enjoy active and pas-sive voting rights in European elections, and has issued two important judgments. 2 The fi rst case (Spain v United Kingdom) was a consequence of the Matthews judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR). 3 In this judgment, the ECtHR decided that the European Parliament (hereinafter EP) must be qualifi ed as a 'legislative organ' in Gibraltar. As a consequence, the United Kingdom was obliged to organise European elections there. However, according to its electoral traditions, the United Kingdom extended active and passive voting rights in European elections to certain persons that are not UK nationals. It recognised these rights for non-UK nationals who are Commonwealth citizens, namely Qualifying Commonwealth Citizens (hereinafter QCCs) residing in Gibraltar. Generally, a Member State may grant higher standards of rights than those prescribed by international law, such as Article 3 of the First Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter ECHR). Questions arise, however, as to the limits to EU citizenship as set down by primary EC law: can (primary) Community law limit the freedom of the Member States to provide third-country nationals with the right to vote at European elections and perhaps, even, the right to be elected to the EP?
In the second case (Eman & Sevinger) the Raad van State of the Netherlands (hereinafter Dutch supreme administrative court) asked the ECJ to give a preliminary ruling on the freedom for a Member State to exclude some of its own citizens from those voting rights when they reside in overseas countries. 4 It is important to emphasise that the Court followed the tendency of the ECtHR and without any diffi culty accepted residence as a limit to voting rights. EC law does not apply in Aruba and hence the EP cannot be considered as a legislative organ there. Thus, neither EC law nor the ECHR or its protocols are capable of granting directly to Eman and Sevinger -who are living in Aruba -the right to vote and stand as a candidate in European elections. The problem here was that Dutch electoral law excluded its own nationals from these elections only when they resided in Aruba and the Dutch Antilles, and not elsewhere in the world. The ECJ was asked to give its ruling on this distinction.
The recent judgments of the ECJ establish important principles on the election of the EP, especially the scope of recognised electoral rights of EU citizens and the boundaries framing national policies in this respect. They either leave Member States free to apply residence criteria in order to limit the scope ratione personae of EU electoral rights or leave Member States free to invoke their own constitutional traditions to extend that scope. However, as will be discussed further, this is not to say that the Member States enjoy complete freedom in the determination of the scope ratione personae of EU electoral rights.
The solutions provided by the ECJ can be criticised on a number of grounds. The fi rst section of the paper analyses active and passive electoral rights in European Parliament elections (see II below) and the subsequent section aims to identify the practical consequences of the above-mentioned case law of the ECJ (see III below). However, those judgments would lose much of their interest if they were not placed in the broader context of European citizenship. A dichotomy arises here: on the one hand, we have the proactive intervention of the ECJ in the fi eld of the right of Union citizens and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States; on the other hand, there are important -and even constitutional -limits to rights of political participation in the framework of European citizenship, even if the ECJ seems to have framed the boundaries of the exercise of the Member States' freedom in this respect (see IV below).
II. The right to vote and stand as a candidate in European elections: an important step but unfi nished move towards EU collective identity
The growing but nonetheless contested idea of a Europe of citizens
While the founding fathers could not have imagined all the consequences of their work, they were not unaware of the importance of the individual for the success of their aims. signing of the Treaty of Rome, however, very little had been done to grant rights to individuals beyond the group of economically active migrants. The President of the Council at that time, and Belgian Prime Minister, Leo Tindemans, proclaimed in a famous report following the 1974 Paris Summit that a specifi c European citizenship was indispensable to consolidate the European project. 6 Despite some initiatives of the Commission, the European Council and the EP, no consensus was reached before the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. This failure is understandable from a historical point of view. At the end of the seventies and during the eighties, European citizenship was considered by 'Eurosceptics' as an extension of Europe far beyond the international scope of the founding Treaties. The internal market was then still largely ineffective and the settlement of rights common to all EU citizens, including electoral rights, was therefore no priority. 7 The EP, with its 'Seitlinger project', recommended that the Member States grant their own nationals the right to vote in European elections wherever they resided in the Community. However, this recommendation was not binding. 8 Some Member States improved their laws on this point, but always on grounds of isolated and spontaneous initiatives. 9 In sum, the sole but nonetheless essential progress made during this period was the fi rst direct elections of the EP in 1979. by substantial EU political rights. In particular, there existed at that time no freedom of movement of voters in European elections.
Maastricht and EU citizenship
The Maastricht Treaty created a Union, an impetus for the development of the collaborative projects of the Member States outside the traditional EC economy-linked policies. The spirit of this reform was to deeply enhance the common values not only of the Member States but also of their citizens. The latter were thus granted the offi cial status of European citizens by Article 17 EC. This provision stipulates moreover that, '[c]itizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship'. A large majority of authors interpreted this as meaning that only EU nationals may benefi t from citizenship and the rights attaching to it.
11 One of the prerogatives specifi cally linked to EU citizenship is the right for each EU citizen to take part, whether actively or passively, in municipal and European elections in a Member State of which he/she is not a national and under the same conditions as nationals of that State. This holds true irrespective of the length of stay in the Member State of residence. An exception, however, was allowed for Luxemburg, where fi ve effective years of residence are required. This rule cannot be applied to EU citizens who have lost those electoral rights in the Member State where they are nationals simply because they reside outside the national territory. 12 The fact that the new chapter on EU citizenship did not generalise the 'free movement of the voters' to all kinds of elections but rather limited its standards to municipal and European elections received much criticism. It was argued that an authentic political Union would have required that EU citizens should enjoy the right to vote and stand as a candidate in all types of elections -regional and national -and irrespective of place of residence. up a proposal for elections by direct universal suffrage in accordance with a uniform procedure in all Member States or in accordance with principles common to all Member States'.
15 Such a proposal requires unanimity in the Council. A directive was adopted on this legal base. This legislation settles basic rules to be applied by Member States in order not to discriminate among EU citizens on grounds of nationality when organising European elections. 16 Article 1 of this Directive leaves Member States free to limit the right to vote and stand as a candidate in European elections for their own citizens who reside in another Member State. 17 As a result of the quite recent agreement of the United Kingdom to set aside its traditional principle of majority representation for the purpose of European elections, these have to be organised following the system of proportional representation. 18 As for the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, this document simply repeats, on the one hand, the right to vote and stand as a candidate in European elections fl owing from Article 19 EC and, on the other hand, the principle that European elections must be held according to universal, free and secret suffrage.
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Signifi cantly also, as has already been mentioned, the case law of the ECtHR has now made clear that the granting of active and passive voting rights in European elections was no longer ancillary but compulsory for EU Member States, since they are members of the Council of Europe and, as a consequence, bound by the ECHR and its compulsory Protocols. This is both the result of Article 3 of the First Additional Protocol to the ECHR and of the EP competences under its legislative functions. passive voting rights of those nationals with dual-nationality can also be limited when rules of international private law lead to the consideration that the foreign nationality is the leading one. 22 To some extent, and as explained below, such solutions are a consequence of Article 16 ECHR, which provides that 'nothing in Article 10, 11 and 14 shall be regarded as preventing the High Contracting Parties from imposing restrictions on the political activity of aliens'. However, the criterion of nationality is nowhere explicitly mentioned by the ECtHR. In other terms, the ECtHR refuses to express its broad consent of limitations of third-country nationals' electoral rights. This observation holds true for all types of elections, not only local or regional but also legislative ones. This could be an indication of the awareness of the ECtHR that the active participation of foreigners in public affairs is a normal evolution towards higher levels of democracy and human rights in Europe, even if in practice the nationality condition is still crucial for the States. Suffi ce it to note that old members of the Council of Europe, such as France, Belgium, Luxemburg and Germany, still exclude foreigners from most electoral processes, above all legislative ballots. This draws severe criticism from commentators, specifi cally in view of the evolution initiated by European citizenship and the right of each national of a Member State of the EU to vote in municipal and European elections irrespective of his/her place of residence. 23 Some argue that nothing can explain the refusal to grant non-EU citizens equal rights, at least when they have been residing in a Member State for a long time. 
The double lack of harmonisation regarding the elections of the EP: irreversible defi ciencies?
Two defi ciencies characterise current Community law in the context of the elections of the European Parliament.
Firstly, no uniform electoral procedure nor a fortiori any constituency exists at EU level. 25 The statement by the European Commission that European elections are organised following 'common principles' amongst the Member States is thus a little misleading.
26 Each State rather constitutes an area where a predefi ned number of seats must be attributed. Member States may choose to divide their territory into several regional constituencies for the purposes of elections to the EP. 27 Almost all technical rules that regulate this election are elaborated at the level of the Member States. 28 This can be illustrated by many examples. Although Member States recently agreed to share the proportional representation principle for the organisation of the European elections, they are almost free to give any practical content to it. As a matter of fact, there are today almost as many proportional representation regimes as there are Member States. 29 For instance, some States apply blocked list polls while others authorise the voter to give preference to several candidates on different lists (panachage). In accordance with the principle of subsidiarité, the minimum age required to stand as a candidate also varies from one Member State to another. For example, whereas in Denmark, Germany, Spain, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and Finland it is suffi cient to be eighteen, in Greece, Italy and Cyprus candidates have to be twenty-fi ve. A third illustration concerns the fact that Member States are not obliged to organise, nor prevented from holding, elections to the EP simultaneously with other elections. Thus, in Belgium European elections take place the same Sunday as elections to the parliaments of the federal entities.
30 This is feasible in practice because those assemblies, like the EP, have a fi veyear mandate. The opposite is true in Sweden where all internal elections (municipal and national) are organised every fourth year.
Secondly, the identity of the benefi ciaries of EU electoral rightswhether for European or municipal elections -is broadly determined at 25 See P Magnette (n 7) 92. See also G De Vries, 'La procédure électorale uniforme du Parlement européen: un pas pour rapprocher l'Europe des citoyens ' (1996) 399 RMCUE 417 to 421. national level. Member States are exclusively competent to grant nationality and they decide who enjoys EU citizenship. 31 We will come back to this point when examining the delicate question of granting electoral rights to non-EU citizens.
There have been some proposals to modify this situation. During their meeting in Tampere in 1999, the Heads of State or Government of the Member States expressed the wish to grant nationality of the State of residence to third-country nationals residing in the Community for a long period. 32 A year later, the European Commission presented its project for 'civic citizenship' which was to be inserted in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. The proposal did not directly deal with nationality issues. Rather, it aimed at providing some EU citizenship rights to thirdcountry nationals, including the right to vote and stand as a candidate in European elections. 33 Of course, the Commission's proposal only foresaw the granting of such rights to foreigners who have been residing in a Member State for a minimum period. The degree of citizenship even progressed in accordance with the length of the stay in the EU. Several legislative resolutions of the EP shared those views. 34 Those initiatives have not yet been followed by the Member States, and EU law remains silent on the 'electoral status' of third-country nationals. Thus, the directive concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents makes no mention of their electoral rights 35 since, according to the Commission itself, the European Community enjoys no competence in this fi eld.
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The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 37 the viability of which is now doubtful, provides no evolution in this respect either. The fact that currently the EP barely represents European peoples but is widely 31 This expressly results from a Declaration annexed to the Maastricht Treaty about the nationality of a Member State. This document provides that such questions are to be resolved only at national level. made up of national delegations was not suffi cient to lever change. 38 The Laeken Declaration, which created the Convention and formulated the main questions to be resolved by the next institutional reform, explicitly encouraged debate on the need to revise the regime governing European elections, for example by creating a homogeneous constituency at the EU level. 39 The EP, following the Commission, proposed an application of this European electoral area for the election of ten percent of the members of the EP. 40 The idea was not only to improve the visibility of the EP for EU citizens but also to form the Commission -at least partially -with European-calibre politicians who won their seat in the EP after a European electoral challenge. In other words, the establishment of a European constituency and a more democratic composition of the Commission were supposed to increase people's interest in EP elections. 41 The preparatory works of the Constitutional Treaty raised discussions on such issues. For instance, a debate was held on the rationalisation of the electoral procedure. This concerned three aspects, namely the creation of supranational constituencies made up of several Member States, grouped following cultural and linguistic affi nities, the drastic limitation of the number of candidates and seats to be attributed within the EP, and the establishment of a unique list made up of all candidates of a constituency and their preferential classifi cation by the voters. 42 All of these proposals were rejected in the end. The sole progress made is the assertion in the text of the Constitutional Treaty that the EP is composed of 'representatives of the Union's citizens'. 43 The reference made in Articles 189 and 190 EC to the 'peoples of the States brought together in the Community' is thus replaced by a more federalist and cohesive vision of EU citizenship. This is, however, a purely symbolic improvement. And even this symbolic upgrading is altered by the preamble of the Constitutional Treaty which recalls that '[the peoples of Europe], while remaining proud of their own national identities and history, […] are determined to transcend their former divi- sions and, united ever more closely, to forge a common destiny'. 44 For the rest, the Constitutional Treaty only repeats what already exists: EU citizenship is additional to national citizenship and does not replace it; 45 every EU citizen has the right to vote and stand as a candidate in European and municipal elections in his state of residence, under the same conditions as the nationals of this Member State; 46 the members of the EP must be elected by direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot. 47 In particular, no softening of the procedure for the harmonisation of the European elections can be found in the Constitutional Treaty. 48 Finally, and as already mentioned, the Constitutional Treaty makes no mention of electoral rights of third-country citizens. The problem of the electoral status of third-country nationals is nevertheless a fundamental one given the increasing immigration in western European countries. Some Member States have large non-national minorities which are almost completely excluded from any political participation. A good illustration of this is the situation of so-called non-citizens in Latvia, namely Sovietera immigrants who have not been granted Latvian citizenship since the restoration of Latvian independence in 1991. 49 The sole evolution provided by the Constitutional Treaty in this respect consists of recognising the right of each person to good administration and the right of access to documents, irrespective of his/her nationality. 50 Those rights complete the EC Treaty, which already granted rights for each person to refer cases of maladministration to the European Ombudsman and to petition the European Parliament. 51 Nevertheless, the problem of the electoral rights of third-country citizens was addressed during the preparatory works of the European Convention. Following the calls made during earlier intergovernmental conferences, some members of the Convention pondered potential evolutions regarding the political rights of third-country na- 44 Emphasis added. 45 See Art I-10 (1). 46 See Art I-10 (2) b and II-99. 47 See Art I-20 (3). 48 See Art III-330 and Art III-126. Unanimity is required in the Council to adopt harmonising measures. Finding a compromise is therefore extremely diffi cult with twenty-seven Member States, unless, perhaps, on purely technical aspects. tionals legally residing in the European Union. Kaufmann and Carnero (members of the EP) and Borell and Garrido (members of the Spanish Parliament) argued that EU citizenship should be granted directly by the Constitution to third-country nationals who have been residing in Europe for a long period. 52 Berès, Duhamel, Paciotti and Van Lancker (members of the EP), and Floch (member of the French Assemblée Nationale) rather supported the inscription in the text of the Constitution of a possibility in this sense. 53 Other proposals were to confer EU citizenship on stateless persons and refugees. 54 The divergent views of the Member States made it impossible to reach a compromise in this respect. Spain even declared in an annex to the Constitutional Treaty that 'only nationals of Member States are entitled to the specifi c rights of European citizenship unless Union law expressly provides otherwise'.
55 Accordingly, not only EU citizenship as a global concept but also all specifi c rights linked to it are exclusively granted to EU nationals. This would be the case for active and passive electoral rights in European and municipal elections. 56 Civic citizenship defended by the Commission was thus rejected.
III. The role of the ECJ in identifying persons who enjoy the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in European elections: fi rst jurisprudential indications
Now that the framework of European (political) citizenship has been described, it is important to come back to the judgments of the ECJ of September 2006 and to assess their impact on EU electoral rights. Both cases raise interesting problems. The fi rst concerns access to active and passive electoral rights for third-country nationals (I). The second revolves around the possibility for Member States to exclude their own citizens from those rights because they do not reside in their national territory (II).
Are Member States free to grant third-country nationals the right to vote and stand as a candidate at European elections?
Case C-145/04 directly follows the famous and much commented Matthews judgment of the ECtHR. 57 In the Matthews judgment, the EC- 52 See Proposed amendments VII(1)7 and VII(2)12 <www.european-convention.eu.int> accessed 15 March 2007. 53 See Proposed amendments VII(1)18 and VII(2)6. 54 See Proposed amendments VII(1)13 (J Voggenhuber and E Lichtenberger) and VII(1)16 (M Nagy).
55 Declaration 47 by the Kingdom of Spain on the defi nition of the term 'nationals'. 56 The United Kingdom made a Declaration (N° 48) to the contrary. 57 See n 3.
tHR confi rmed that a Member State of the EU can be held responsible for a breach of the ECHR by a provision of EU primary law if that primary law provision is incapable of existing without the consent of all Member States. 58 The facts were as follows: Mrs Matthews, a British citizen, was excluded from voting in European elections because she lived in Gibraltar. This was the result of an Annex to the 1976 Act related to European elections, which forbids the United Kingdom from organising them outside its own territory 59 even though Community law applies in Gibraltar, since this is a territory for whose external relations UK is responsible. 60 Mrs Matthews had brought an action before national courts without obtaining any satisfaction, and so brought her case before the ECtHR in Strasbourg. Her main argument was that the United Kingdom had breached her right to free elections guaranteed by Article 3 of the First Additional Protocol to the ECHR.
After having lost the case before the ECtHR, the United Kingdom made efforts to obtain, if not the total removal, at least an amendment of the Annex. Spain, however, persisted in refusing any change in this respect for political and historical reasons. Spain refused to accept this extension. It fi rstly complained before the European Commission, which considered the case too politically sensitive to receive a clear-cut answer.
62 Spain then brought the United Kingdom before the ECJ to obtain recognition of UK's failure to respect EC law. It is important to distinguish the two legal arguments invoked by Spain. 58 In other terms, the contested norm would not exist should the Member State in question not have accepted it. 59 This was before Annex II but it became Annex I after the renumbering operated by the Council Decision of 25 June and 23 September 2002, above n 10. In the rest of the text, we shall speak, for clarity, of Annex I. 60 Art 299(4) EC. 61 In the United Kingdom, several electoral constituencies exist for the purposes of European elections. The Kingdom of Spain argued with its fi rst means of action that the EC Treaty as such forbids a Member State from granting third-country nationals EU citizenship rights. According to the Kingdom of Spain, the ECJ should take into account -when deciding whether a QCC could have the right to vote and stand as a candidate at European elections in Gibraltar -the declaration made by the United Kingdom itself in 1982 on the defi nition of the term 'nationals' for the purposes of EC law. 63 Yet, the United Kingdom was not disputing that QCCs are not within the categories set out in this Declaration. Spain wanted to use this fact to deny QCCs any voting rights in European elections. Spain then relied on the narrow link between, on the one hand, Articles 17 and 19 EC combined with the notion of EU citizenship, with, on the other hand, the nationality of a Member State. Articles 189 and 190 EC, which describe the EP as an assembly made up of representatives of the 'peoples of the States brought together in the Community', would confi rm this conclusion. This is consistent with the general thrust of commentators at the time on the introduction of EU citizenship in the EC Treaty: surely the fact that the EC Treaty grants EU citizenship to nationals of the Member States and enumerates a list of rights linked to it necessarily means that those rights belong exclusively to EU nationals.
However, both the Advocate General Tizzano and the ECJ have rejected this argument. 64 The ECJ argues that the 1982 Declaration made by the United Kingdom, although important, only concerned the scope of those provisions of the EC Treaty that refer to the concept of 'national', such as the provisions relating to the freedom of movement of persons. Contrary to what the Kingdom of Spain argued, this Declaration could not therefore be used to prevent the extension of EU voting rights to QCCs when residing in Gibraltar. 65 Moreover, besides the fact that the 'people' is a vague concept from which no unambiguous conclusion is possible, Article 19 EC only deals with the electoral rights of EU citizens who are freely circulating within the Union. This provision does not concern the political rights of third-country nationals. Article 17 EC, for its part, only means that the status of national of a Member State confers EU citizenship in principle. Again, the purpose of this article is not to exclude non-EU citizens from Union citizenship. Nor is it to forbid a Member State from granting EU citizenship rights to third-country nationals. This would be confi rmed, implicitly, by the EC Treaty itself when it grants each person, irrespective of his/her nationality, the right to petition the EP or to refer cases of maladministration to the European Ombudsman.
The Court adds a more practical consideration. Were a Member State to grant citizens of third-countries the right to vote and to stand as candidates in European elections, this would in no way affect the proportional importance of this State within the EP. The same holds true for the size and the identity of other Member States' delegations in the EP. Considering that Member States are -as mentioned above -almost totally free to organise elections to the EP, and also that this kind of evolution is not prejudicial to the other parties to the EC/EU Treaties, the conclusion must be that Member States may recognise the right of third-country nationals to take part in elections to the EP. 66 The consequent possibility that a third-country national might take a seat as a Member of the European Parliament is not analysed by the ECJ. In all probability, the Court was aware of this possibility but it did not consider this curtailed the Member States' freedom in this fi eld.
Whereas the ECJ refuses to forbid Member States from developing the political status of third-country nationals, it emphasises that this freedom is not absolute. The ECJ considers that the people who are granted such electoral rights must have a close link with the Member State in question 67 and that in any case the Member States must observe Community law and the classical principles of equality and proportionality. Furthermore, the ECJ seems to have been infl uenced by the constitutional tradition of the United Kingdom. 68 All this shows that the Court is certainly conscious that granting non-EU citizens electoral rights is a particularly sensitive question and that it therefore cannot be too liberal in this respect. The Advocate General went a step further. He asserted that third-country nationals could only be granted voting rights at European elections in 'exceptional circumstances'. 69 Although the Advocate General did not explain exactly what those circumstances are, this is going too far in my opinion. This could mean that a Member State is not free to grant immigrants who have been legally resident in its territory for a long period the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in European elections. Such a restrictive solution runs counter to the subsidiary character of the main part of the European Parliament election's procedure, 66 Ibid para 77. 67 Ibid para 76.
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Ibid paras 63 and 79. The emphasis of the Court on this element means in particular that there exists no common point of view between the EU Member States to grant thirdcountry nationals a harmonised political status. As a consequence, no redefi nition of fundamental rights is possible through Art 6(2) EU. This constitutional tradition had already been noticed by the ECJ in the Kaur judgment. See above n 62 para 20. but also the increasing tendency to grant third-country nationals possibilities to have their views taken into account at the political level.
The second ground invoked by Spain raises more diffi cult questions. Annex I of the 1976 Act limits the European Parliament elections in the United Kingdom to the sole territory of this Member State. Its overseas zones of infl uence were therefore excluded. As mentioned above, the ECtHR declared that this limitation breached the right to free elections in Gibraltar, an area where Community law is applicable. Consequently, European Parliament elections had to be organised by the United Kingdom on this territory. Spain claimed, however, that this judgment did not imply an extension of the European Parliament election to QCCs, who are not British citizens. The United Kingdom could only breach primary law (the Annex) when this is necessary for the protection of a fundamental right, according to Article 6(2) EU. Current interpretation of the ECHR and its Protocols, in particular Article 3 of the First Protocol, still allows States to apply nationality conditions in electoral matters. This also holds true for legislative polls. Since QCCs are not citizens of the United Kingdom for the purposes of the elections, the United Kingdom could not proceed with the extension.
Contrary to the fi rst ground of action, the Advocate General and the ECJ defend opposite views here. Whereas the fi rst almost totally agrees with Spain's reasoning, 70 the ECJ argues that if the United Kingdom extended the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in European elections to QCCs, this was in order 'to enable the Gibraltar electorate to vote in elections to the European Parliament as part of and on the same terms as the electorate of an existing United Kingdom constituency'. The United Kingdom therefore modifi ed its legislation 'to comply with the requirements resulting from those "same terms"'. 71 In rather terse terms, the Court then concludes that the United Kingdom's extension does not breach Community law. Why did the ECJ reject Spain's argument? In my opinion, this solution cannot be the direct result of the Matthews judgment of the ECtHR:
72 indeed, and as already mentioned, this case only concerned British nationals who reside in Gibraltar. Therefore, it did not impose as such that the United Kingdom grant the QCCs residing in Gibraltar voting rights in the European elections. Although it is not obvious in the terms of the judgment itself, the Court seems aware nevertheless that QCCs are granted voting rights in European elections when they reside in the United Kingdom itself. If the United Kingdom had not allowed the QCCs to take part in elections to the EP in Gibraltar, this would have 70 Ibid para 128. 71 Case C-145/04 paras 91 and 93. 72 Compare L Burgogue-Larsen (n 2) 41-43. meant that the QCCs could in the future have lost those voting rights when residing in the United Kingdom. In other words, any solution other than extending EU voting rights to the QCCs in Gibraltar could have been discriminatory among the QCCs themselves. 73 Contrary to the argumentation of Advocate General Tizzano, a departure from the requirements of the Annex could be therefore indispensable to the protection of a fundamental right, i.e. the non-discrimination principle. One objection could be that Article 16 ECHR provides that '[n]othing in Articles 10, 11 and 14 shall be regarded as preventing the High Contracting Parties from imposing restrictions on the political activity of aliens'. This article confi rms that limitations to the political rights of nonnationals are in principle admissible. This provision must be nevertheless correctly understood. As is widely confi rmed by the case law of the ECtHR, it means that the nationality criterion is not discriminatory regarding electoral matters. Yet to my mind, Article 16 could not be used to justify discriminatory rules within a category of third-country nationals. In such a case, the question is no longer about restrictions to their political rights, but about a coherent policy in political matters. It would hardly be acceptable to grant some third-country nationals political rights while at the same time refusing those rights to other third-country nationals who are objectively in the same situation, for example because of their common historical link with the State of residence. Anyway, and more fundamentally, the ECJ was free and was even encouraged to provide a higher protection of fundamental rights than that required by the ECHR and its protocols. In its Bosphorus judgment, the ECtHR went so far as not to control the activity of EU institutions, provided EU law guarantees an 'equivalent protection' of fundamental rights. 76 This last element has also certainly been a contributory factor in the thinking of the ECJ when it avoids being too explicit in its fi nal ratio decidendi. Faced with such a delicate question of discrimination in the fi eld of political rights, the ECJ has protected the Community legal order by giving precedence to the solution which most protects fundamental rights without going to any great lengths to explain why.
Can EU citizens residing outside the Union be excluded from the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament?
This second question is related to the Eman & Sevinger case (Case C-300/04). In its judgment, the ECJ entirely followed the Advocate General. 77 Here, the legal exclusion of certain Dutch State citizens residing in Aruba, an island belonging to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, from the right to vote and stand as a candidate in European elections was at stake. An important feature of the case is that those rights were recognised for Dutch nationals residing abroad but other than in Aruba or the Dutch Antilles.
The ECJ decided in Eman & Sevinger that citizenship rights are available in principle to all Member States' nationals, even when they reside outside the Community. 78 This was a reply to the Dutch government's argument that EU citizenship rights should only be available on the territory of the Community. 79 Beyond this general contention, the ECJ again considers that the identifi cation of the holders of the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in European elections currently belongs to each Member State in compliance with Community law. 80 In the absence of common rules, it is for the Member States to adopt the rules which are best adapted to their constitutional structure. 81 The circumstance that some States -like France -organise European elections in overseas countries where Community law does not apply entirely is not a reason to make this practice compulsory for the other Member States. Furthermore, such rights can be subject to conditions. 82 Whereas EC law does not apply in Aruba -the territory where Eman and Sevinger resideArticle 3 of the First Protocol to the ECHR does not apply in this case. 83 As a consequence, the applicants cannot require the Netherlands to provide them with active and passive voting rights in European elections. The ECJ recalls here the case law of the ECtHR according to which limitations to political rights through residence criteria are not contrary to the ECHR and its protocols as such.
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Notwithstanding this conclusion, the ECJ observes that 'the principle of equal treatment prevents […] the criteria chosen from resulting in different treatment of nationals who are in comparable situations, unless that difference in treatment is objectively justifi ed'. According to the Court, the Netherlands did not suffi ciently justify why they allow all their citizens residing abroad to take part in the European elections, except those residing in the Dutch Antilles or in Aruba. 85 In comparison with the judgment in Case C-145/04, the ECJ analysed more explicitly the conformity of national legislation with the non-discrimination principle. Admittedly, the fundamental rights question here was easier to solve than in the Gibraltar case. Anyway, both judgments provide a high level of protection of fundamental rights, especially regarding the non-discrimination principle.
In its judgment following the preliminary ruling of the ECJ, the Dutch supreme administrative court confi rmed the illegality of this exclusion. The Dutch authorities failed again to provide any objective justifi cation for the difference in treatment. 86 However, according to this judgment, it is for the Dutch political authorities to decide on a solution in the future, and anyway before the next elections to the EP in 2009. This solution might not necessarily imply that Dutch citizens residing in Aruba would be granted the right to vote and stand as a candidate in European elections, provided that the discrimination issue is solved. Moreover, the judgment made it clear that the illegality was limited to the sole provisions of Dutch law related to elections to the EP and did not extend to national elections. 81 Ibid para 50. 82 Ibid paras 52 and 53. 83 Ibid paras 48 to 50. It is important here to mention that Eman and Sevinger had brought a parallel case before the Dutch supreme administrative court, complaining against their exclusion from voting rights in the election of the Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (Second National Chamber of the Netherlands). 87 The reason for the refusal was that they had not been residing in the Netherlands for a minimum period of ten years. The link with the Netherlands would be therefore too weak to grant Eman and Sevinger active and passive voting rights for the appointment of the Second National Chamber. Again, Dutch citizens not residing in Aruba or in the Dutch Antilles were granted those rights, even if they had never resided in the Netherlands. The Dutch supreme administrative court rejected the claims. According to its judgment, Eman and Sevinger could participate in the election of the parliamentary organ of Aruba, which is widely involved in the legislative process of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. 88 The situation of Dutch citizens residing in the Netherlands and in Aruba is therefore different regarding 'national' elections, so that no discrimination can be identifi ed.
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This result was opposite to what the Raad van State had decided in the case concerning European elections. The reason for this discrepancy lies precisely in the difference between the two situations that must be compared in both cases. 90 In the case concerning national elections, both categories of Dutch citizens did not elect the same legislative organ: the representative organs of Aruba or the Dutch Antilles when the voters resided in those territories, 91 and the Second National Chamber of the Netherlands in other cases. On the contrary, in the case concerning European elections, the sole election at stake was that to the EP. Even if Community law did not apply outside the Netherlands, the difference introduced by Dutch law regarding European elections between Dutch citizens living in Aruba and the Dutch Antilles on one hand and those living abroad but not in those territories on the other hand 92 was therefore discriminatory because it concerned the same legislative organ and was not justifi ed on suffi cient objective grounds. Between Dutch citizens residing in Aruba or the Dutch Antilles on the one hand and those who do not live in the Netherlands but live elsewhere, other than in Aruba or the Dutch Antilles on the other hand. 91 These people could also participate in the election of the Second National Chamber of the Netherlands if they had resided for at least ten years in the Netherlands. 92 See Case 300/04 para 58.
IV. A comparison between 'economic-oriented' and 'political-oriented' rights linked to EU citizenship: a several-speed Europe of citizens?
The recent case law of the ECJ regarding elections to the EP raises once again questions as to the coherence of European citizenship as a whole. 93 A comparison between those judgments and the case law of the ECJ revolving around 'economic-oriented' freedoms results in quite a paradoxical picture: on the one hand the Court underlines the existence of a specifi c European citizenship, which undoubtedly is signifi cant in the sphere of political rights such as the right to petition, the passive and active right to take part in elections to the EP, etc.; on the other hand, the Court shows restraint when defi ning the scope of those EU citizenship 'political' rights.
Before entering into this discussion, let us make an observation as to the principle itself of the intervention of the ECJ in cases like Spain v. United Kingdom and Eman & Sevinger. Certainly, these judgments concerned purely internal situations, even though they related to the conditions of enjoyment of Community voting rights. Contrary to most of the following judgments linked to the four Community freedoms, there was no cross-border element here that 'naturally' justifi ed the intervention of the Court of Justice. After all, Art 19(2) EC only provides that 'every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he is not a national shall have the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament in the Member State in which he resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State'. 94 The ECJ therefore had maybe less room for manoeuvre when faced with situations where, as was the case in both of the commented judgments, no EU citizen was deprived of a Community right when travelling within the Union.
Admittedly, however, the right to vote and stand as a candidate in European elections is independent of any movement within the Union. required to enjoy these EU citizenship rights, especially not a cross-border element. Thus, in my opinion, the competence of the ECJ to give a preliminary ruling in the Dutch case and to assess the compliance of the United Kingdom's EPRA with Community law could not be questioned.
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This is all the more true since Art 220 EC as such does not subordinate the competence of the ECJ to any cross-border requirement.
EU Citizenship rights before the ECJ: discrepancies between the freedoms of movement and of residence and EU electoral rights?
The freedoms of movement and of residence are essential Community rights. They are not only qualifi ed as citizenship rights set out in part two of the EC Treaty, but occupy an essential position within the Treaty chapters devoted to Community policies. The role played by the ECJ in establishing the Union's constitutional foundations has been signifi cant in interpreting these rights. Several cases illustrate this observation.
The freedoms of movement and of residence were basically only applicable to persons exercising an economic activity. The ECJ has nevertheless construed this condition broadly. In its Franca Ninni-Orasche judgment, for example, the ECJ considered that employment of two and a half months could be classed as an economic activity 'provided that the activity performed as an employed person is not purely marginal and ancillary'. 97 But even in those cases where a person does not exercise an economic activity, the ECJ has given a wide interpretation to Articles 12, 17 and 18 EC. 98 The ECJ only makes use of these provisions when other Treaty bases -such as Articles 39 or 43 EC -are not applicable. 99 In D'Hoop, a case about students, the ECJ decided that EU citizenship 'precludes a Member State from refusing to grant the tideover allowance to one of its nationals, a student seeking her fi rst employment, on the sole ground that that student completed her secondary education in another Member State'. 100 In the Baumbast judgment, the Court added that the freedoms of movement and of residence are only admissible when the citizens in question do not represent an 'unreasonable burden on the 96 An author criticised the ECJ for not having explained the grounds of its competence in these cases. See M Claes (n 2) 216. public fi nances of the host State'. 101 The Trojani case concerned persons who were not studying or exercising an economic activity but who had worked in their country of residence in the past. 102 The Court introduced a distinction here between the residence of EU citizens and the granting of social rights to persons whose right to live in their Member State of residence is not contested. Whereas in the fi rst case the criterion of economic dependence can validate limitations of the right to freely reside in another Member State, in the second case such a limitation must be considered as discrimination on the grounds of nationality, which is forbidden by Article 12 EC. This case law has been confi rmed in the Bidar case concerning a French student who was legally resident in the United Kingdom. As a result of his French nationality, the United Kingdom refused to grant him fi nancial assistance to cover his maintenance costs during his university studies. The ECJ decided that the English system breached the non-discrimination principle contained in Article 12 EC. 103 More generally, the ECJ sanctions Member States when they discourage their own non-economically active citizens to be a resident of another Member State by subordinating the granting of an advantage to the condition that they reside on the national territory. Apart from the D'Hoop case above, the Pusa case also illustrates this ban. In this case, a disadvantageous fi scal regime applied to nationals residing abroad was the subject of contention. 104 Another good example is the Tas-Hagen case concerning the refusal to grant an allowance to civilians who are victims of war but who reside outside their national territory. 105 The Morgan and Bucher cases, still pending, raise identical problems concerning students who wish to receive fi nancial aid from their Member State but who study abroad.
Furthermore, the ECJ judged in the above-mentioned Micheletti case that the sole fact that a national of a Member State holds the nationality of a third-country is no reason to refuse him/her the benefi t of Community law, especially the right to freely move within the Union. 107 According to the ECJ, 'the provisions of Community law on freedom of establishment preclude a Member State from denying a national of another Member State who possesses at the same time the nationality of a non-member country entitlement to that freedom on the ground that the law of the host State deems him to be a national of the non-member country'. This conclusion is not affected by the circumstance that nationality policies are part of Member States' competences. 108 In other terms, a Member State cannot invoke its own rules of private international law to exclude the application of the Community freedoms of movement to bi-nationals who have the nationality of a Member State. The same conclusion applies a fortiori to EU citizens who are simultaneously nationals of several Member States. 109 A similar reasoning can be found in the Saldanha case, which concerned the requirement by Austria of a guarantee of coverage of procedural costs from foreigners who are plaintiffs in proceedings before Austrian courts, 110 and in the Zhu & Chen case, where the freedom of residence of a Community national was at stake. 111 As well summarised in the famous Grzelczyk judgment, 'Union citizenship is [therefore] destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, enabling those who fi nd themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for'.
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In the fi eld of electoral rights, the ECJ rather observes that nationality questions are still a matter for national competence. It is therefore currently for the Member States to determine who enjoys active and passive voting rights in European elections, and this in compliance with Community law. This implies that in principle the Member States may grant citizens of third-countries such rights or exclude their own citizens residing outside Europe from benefi ting from them. However, and as already mentioned, the recent judgments of the ECJ do not grant the Member States total freedom in this respect. 113 The extension of voting rights to non-EU citizens seems to be possible only when a close link can be identifi ed with the Member State in question. Furthermore, the ECJ in its recent judgments apparently took into account the constitutional tradition of the United Kingdom and the specifi c state structure of the Netherlands, although it is not clear whether and to what extent the ECJ considers such peculiarities to be a real condition for any differentiation in European voting rights. 114 Anyway, a limitation of these rights on grounds of residence criteria is only acceptable in accordance with the general principles of Community law, especially the non-discrimination principle.
Nevertheless, this relative prudence on the part of the ECJ is not the result of any shyness. This is rather the consequence of the lack of consensus among Member States to determine precisely who benefi ts from the voting rights in European elections. This lack of consensus about the political aspects of EU citizenship is well illustrated by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, intended as the fi rst autonomous corpus of human rights of the EC/EU. Contrary to electoral rights, this Charter expressly provides that 'freedom of movement and residence may be granted, in accordance with the Treaty establishing the European Community, to nationals of third countries legally resident in the territory of a Member State'. 115 A comparable provision concerning electoral rights has neither been inserted in the Charter nor in the Constitutional Treaty. This could mean that whereas the freedoms to move and to reside within the Union are natural Community rights and could even be extended to third-country nationals, voting rights, because of their political sensitivity, remain essentially a matter of national competence.
An 'à la carte' EU citizenship? Realism in the analysis of the consequences of Spain v United Kingdom and Eman & Sevinger
The foregoing developments might give the impression of an à la carte EU citizenship, determined according to the type of right and the place where it is invoked. 116 Singularly, the case law of the ECJ seems to 113 See also the conclusions of the AG Tizzano para 64. 114 In the Gibraltar case, the ECJ seems to have been sensitive to the fact that the extension of voting rights to QCCs was also foreseen for national elections. See Case 145/04 para 79. be more far-reaching when dealing with the freedoms of movement than when fi xing some boundaries of the Member States' freedom regarding EU electoral rights. But the consequences of the judgments of the ECJ dated 12 September 2006 should not be exaggerated.
Firstly, as already noted, the ECJ does not give the Member States complete freedom when defi ning the groups of persons enjoying voting rights in European elections. The core groups of benefi ciaries are no doubt Member States' nationals, and any exception to this principle seems to be subordinated to some specifi c explanation. It is not relevant to repeat here the reasoning of the ECJ.
A second reason is that, contrary to Kauff-Gazin's assertion, in my opinion those judgments do not change anything in the Micheletti case law. 117 The ECJ has indeed suffi ciently emphasised the scope of the recent judgments: they concern only purely political rights, such as the right to vote or to stand as a candidate in European elections. When economic or social rights are at stake, it remains the case that Community law exercises a considerable infl uence on the Member States, even with regard to nationality questions. The Member States have defi nitely lost a part of their sovereignty in these fi elds.
The third reason is a direct consequence of the case law of the ECtHR. If the ECJ allows a Member State to exclude nationals from European elections when they reside outside the national territory, this conclusion, as a result of Matthews, is limited to territories where the EP plays no part as a legislative organ. In other cases, EU nationals must have the right to choose their deputies to the EP and stand as a candidate therefor.
Last, and as already mentioned, the ECJ point of view is perfectly respectful of the constitutional reality framed by primary law. Rights to political participation are indeed very poorly defi ned in the EC Treaty and the 1976 Act, while economic freedoms are an essential part of the Community policy. As for the reference in Articles 189 and 190 EC to the 'peoples' of Europe when they describe the Members of the EP, such a concept is quite theoretical and vague. Moreover, it is capable of different meanings in the Member States. Consequently, in the commented judgments, the Court was not privileging one solution over another on grounds of the potential scope of the 'European peoples'. For all these reasons, nothing could justify, in my opinion, the ECJ going further in harmonising the scope ratione personae of elections to the EP.
V. Conclusion
This leads us to some conclusive remarks. The current fundaments of EU citizenship are weak, especially in the fi eld of political rights. This is in particular the result of the lack of suffi ciently harmonised procedural rules for elections to the European Parliament. The sheer number of members of the EP, the existence of national constituencies and, last but not least, the fact that European voters do not exercise a direct choice of members of the future European Commission prevent European Parliament elections from being any true citizens' forum for EU politics. 119 -the differences highlighted in this article between the various EU citizenship rights certainly do not improve the Union's general public image. 120 However, as evidenced by the judgments Spain v. United Kingdom and Eman & Sevinger, the ECJ certainly could not be held responsible for this situation. The problem is of a constitutional nature. For this reason, the signifi cance of European elections in the European democratic process should be discussed globally once again at the political level.
